Iranian presidential election enters final phase amid elite contestation

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Big Picture

Iran’s presidential election, triggered by the sudden death of President Raisi, is a critical test of regime resilience under acute internal and external pressures. This is not a routine political event but a forced recalibration of leadership amid elite contestation, public disengagement, and regional volatility. The outcome will shape both Iran’s domestic trajectory and its posture in ongoing regional confrontations.

What Happened

In the final phase of the election process, Iran’s Guardian Council disqualified multiple high-profile candidates, narrowing the field to a select group of regime-approved contenders. This follows the unexpected death of President Raisi, which disrupted succession planning and intensified competition among elite factions. The Supreme Leader and the IRGC are actively maneuvering to ensure regime continuity and internal cohesion. Public interest remains low, with widespread cynicism about the process, while economic hardship and regional instability persist.

Why It Matters

This election exposes the regime’s vulnerability to legitimacy crises, elite fragmentation, and external threats. The forced narrowing of candidates highlights the system’s prioritization of control over legitimacy, increasing the risk of public disengagement and elite disunity. The situation is a stress test for the Islamic Republic’s ability to manage simultaneous pressures across political, economic, security, and information domains. Failure to maintain cohesion could precipitate deeper crises or force more repressive or adventurist policies.

Strategic Lens

Main actors—the Supreme Leader’s office, IRGC, and rival conservative factions—are incentivized to maximize influence over succession and policy direction while constrained by legitimacy deficits, economic strain, and contested information space. The regime prioritizes elite consensus and stability over broad-based participation, accepting low turnout as a cost. All actors face severe limits on their ability to buy social peace or contain unrest without risking further fragmentation or external escalation. Risky behavior—including repression or regional adventurism—remains rational if perceived as necessary to preserve regime continuity or deter rivals.

What Comes Next

Most Likely: The transition is managed through institutional mechanisms, resulting in a regime-loyal conservative president with IRGC backing. Elite consensus is prioritized over legitimacy; low turnout is tolerated. The new administration focuses on consolidating order, incremental economic management, calibrated regional posture, and tighter information controls. Public dissent is contained through selective repression and co-optation. Internationally, Iran avoids direct escalations but leverages proxies and diplomacy to manage external threats.

Most Dangerous: A breakdown in elite consensus triggers open contestation—manifesting as public fraud accusations, damaging leaks, or mobilized protests—escalating into a broader crisis of authority. Rival factions may attempt to co-opt security forces or public support, prompting mass repression or internet shutdowns. Alternatively, internal fractures could drive regional escalation or nuclear brinkmanship as distraction. Such dynamics risk uncontrollable crisis cascades across political, security, economic, and information systems, sharply raising prospects of regime fragmentation or state failure with unpredictable regional consequences.

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