Chinese naval exercises near Taiwan prompt heightened regional alert
China's expanded naval exercises near Taiwan have triggered heightened alert across East Asia. This signals a structural shift in regional security dynamics, raising risks of miscalculation among China, Taiwan, the US, and allies as they recalibrate deterrence.
Big Picture
This is a major escalation in the ongoing great power competition in East Asia, marked by a deliberate intensification of Chinese military signaling near Taiwan. The situation is consequential because it challenges the operational status quo in the Taiwan Strait, tests regional security arrangements, and increases the risk of miscalculation among multiple heavily armed actors.
What Happened
China has shifted from routine deterrence to conducting large-scale, coordinated naval exercises in close proximity to Taiwan. The scale and complexity of these operations exceed previous patterns, prompting Taiwan, the United States, Japan, and other regional actors to raise alert levels and adjust their military postures. This represents a clear attempt by Beijing to redefine boundaries and probe the response thresholds of its adversaries.
Why It Matters
The normalization of heightened Chinese military activity near Taiwan risks eroding long-standing deterrence structures and blurring red lines. This shift places the regional security order under strain by increasing the likelihood of accidents, misinterpretation, or forced responses. If left unaddressed, it could lower the threshold for future coercive actions and destabilize alliance commitments, with potential spillover effects on global economic and security systems.
Strategic Lens
Main actors face acute trade-offs: China seeks to deter moves toward Taiwanese independence and demonstrate resolve without triggering uncontrollable escalation or incurring prohibitive diplomatic costs. Taiwan must maintain public confidence and deterrence while avoiding provocation or panic. The US and its allies are balancing reassurance and deterrence with the imperative to avoid direct conflict with China. All sides are constrained by the catastrophic risks of escalation, alliance credibility pressures, domestic political considerations, and the need for crisis management mechanisms.
What Comes Next
Most Likely: The situation stabilizes at a higher baseline of military activity. China continues periodic large-scale exercises as both signal and rehearsal but avoids direct kinetic action. Taiwan increases readiness and seeks measured support from partners; the US and allies respond with visible but non-escalatory actions. Crisis communications remain active, allowing all parties to manage escalation risks while adjusting to a more tense equilibrium.
Most Dangerous: Miscalculation or domestic political pressures could trigger rapid escalation—potentially through an incident at sea or in the air—leading to casualties or loss of equipment. This could force limited kinetic actions or economic retaliation, drawing in the US and Japan due to alliance commitments. De-escalation would become extremely difficult, risking broader regional conflict with significant global repercussions.
How we got here
The security order in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding region was originally shaped by a combination of Cold War alliances, ambiguous diplomatic formulas, and a tacit understanding that military activity would remain within certain bounds. After the US and China normalized relations in the late 1970s, Washington maintained unofficial ties with Taipei through the Taiwan Relations Act, while Beijing asserted its "One China" principle. For decades, this uneasy arrangement relied on restraint: China limited overt military pressure, the US avoided explicit security guarantees, and Taiwan refrained from formal moves toward independence. This balance was never static, but it set expectations about what counted as routine signaling versus destabilizing escalation. Over time, several factors chipped away at these boundaries. As China’s economic and military power grew, so did its capacity—and willingness—to project force near Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army Navy modernized rapidly, moving from coastal defense to blue-water operations. Meanwhile, US arms sales to Taiwan and periodic high-level visits signaled ongoing support, prompting Beijing to test how far it could push without triggering direct confrontation. Each side adjusted incrementally: China expanded exercises and patrols; the US increased freedom of navigation operations; Taiwan invested in asymmetric defenses. These steps were often justified as responses to the other’s actions, gradually shifting what was considered normal military behavior in the area. Alliances and partnerships further complicated the picture. Japan and Australia deepened security ties with the US in response to regional uncertainty, while ASEAN states hedged between economic links to China and security concerns about its assertiveness. The result is a landscape where military posturing is both a tool of deterrence and a form of communication—one that all parties have become accustomed to using more frequently and more visibly. What was once exceptional—the large-scale demonstration of force close to Taiwan—has become part of an evolving playbook for managing rivalry and signaling resolve.